The 2019 presidential election in Senegal: Electoral practices between permanencies, opportunities, and ruptures

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The 2019 presidential election marked a shift in Senegal’s political history: a new electoral law was introduced that required candidates to collect a certain number of signatures in order to appear on the ballot; the traditional parties—the Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, PS) and the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti démocratique sénégalais, PDS)—had no candidate; and the diaspora vote was a major issue. Mapping, considered here as a ‘discovery operator’ from a political science perspective, makes it possible to undertake an initial analysis of the dynamics of the 2019 presidential election.

Keywords: Senegal – elections – citizen sponsorship – signature collection – diaspora – electoral geography

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Did the signature collection requirement foretell the results?

In the 2019 presidential election, a new requirement, known as ‘parrainage citoyen’ [‘citizen sponsorship’], was introduced into electoral law. Following the revision of Article 29 of the Senegalese Constitution and of the Electoral Code, ‘every candidate in an election who is presented by a legally formed political party, by a coalition of legally formed political parties, or by a group of independent persons, must present a list of elector signatures’. The number of signatures required ranges from a minimum of 0.8% of electors to a maximum of 1%. Moreover, these signatures must come from at least seven (out of fourteen) regions, with a minimum of 2,000 per region. The rest can come freely from anywhere in the country or from expatriates. The law also states that ‘an elector can sponsor only one candidate per election’. The Constitutional Council is charged with verifying the lists of signatures according to the order in which they were received.

For the 2019 presidential election, twenty-seven candidates filed a list of signatures and other required documents with the administrative office of the Constitutional Council from 11–26 December 2018. The lists of seven candidates were approved: Macky Sall, Idrissa Seck, Ousmane Sonko, El Hadj Issa Sall, Madiké Niang, Karim Meïssa Wade and Khalifa A. Sall. The Constitutional Council approved five of these seven candidates for the presidential ballot of 24 February 2019: Macky Sall, Idrissa Seck, Ousmane Sonko, El Hadj Issa Sall, and Madiké Niang.

1. Since the printed version of Afrique contemporaine is black and white, it cannot render the entirety of the information represented on the maps. We suggest the reader refer to the digital version of the article to access its full scope.
4. Article L57, Electoral Code. Translator’s note: Our translation. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of cited foreign language material in this article are our own.
5. If an elector’s signature appears on more than one list, only the signature on the list that was inspected first is accepted; the others are rejected. However, if this rejection results in a potential candidate falling short of the total minimum number of signatures or the minimum required by region, the candidate in question is notified, and then has forty-eight hours to gather the number of signatures needed to replace those that were declared invalid.
6. Article L.118, CE, law no. 2018 of 4 July 2018; JORD no. 7106 of 5 July 2018, p. 971. Forty-three days before the election, the Constitutional Council notifies any candidate whose lists were declared invalid due to duplicate signatures. If the minimum of 0.8% has not been reached as a result of signature rejections, the candidates then have forty-eight hours from being notified to gather new signatures.
7. Son of former president Abdoulaye Wade.
8. He went on to run in the presidential election at the head of the Idy 2019 coalition, which included Cheick Hadjibou Soumaré, El Hadj Malick Gakou, Pape Diop, Moustapha Mamba Guirassy, Abdoul Mbaye, and Khalifa Ababacar Sall, former mayor of Dakar, who were declared ineligible to stand in the election by the Constitutional Council.
10. Founded by Macky Sall in 2008 after he left Abdoulaye Wade’s Parti démocratique sénégalais (PDS) (Senegalese Democratic Party) (PDS).
11. In the Wolof language, rehmi means ‘the country’.
12. Le Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) (Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement) has since 1982 been calling for independence for the region, which is in the south of Senegal.
14. The most widespread branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in West Africa generally and Senegal in particular, where it is very influential.
15. An adherent of Mouridism, founded by Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba (1853–1927). The Mouride brotherhood is a Sufi (Suni) organization that has significant influence in Senegalese politics.
Before proceeding with the analysis, some background on the candidates is warranted:

- Macky Sall was the incumbent, first elected in 2012. He represents the Benno Bokk Yakaar (BBY) coalition, which includes the Alliance pour la République (Alliance for the Republic) (APR)\(^{10}\), the Socialist Party (Parti socialiste, PS), led by Ousmane Tanor Dieng, and the Alliance des forces du progrès (Alliance of Forces for Progress) (AFP), led by Moustapha Niasse, president of the National Assembly since 2012.

- Idrissa Seck leads the Rewmi Party\(^ {11}\), founded in 2006. After serving as prime minister under Abdoulaye Wade from 2002–2004, he fell into disgrace in 2005. On 23 July of that year, he was incarcerated and spent 199 days in prison before being quietly released, on 7 September 2006. He is also the former mayor of Thiès and the current president of its departmental council.

- Ousmane Sonko, who grew up in the Casamance region\(^ {12}\), is the president of the Patriotes du Sénégal pour le travail, l’éthique et la fraternité (Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Brotherhood) (PASTEF), founded in 2014. He was elected as a member of parliament in 2017 and served as an internal auditor at the internal inspection department of the Direction générale des impôts et domaines (national tax administration). After publishing numerous critiques of the government and President Macky Sall, in August 2016\(^ {13}\) he was removed from his post in the tax administration for breach of professional confidentiality. This positioned him as the ‘anti-establishment candidate’ in the eyes of the public.

- El Hadj Issa Sall, founder of the University of the Sahel, was put forward by the Parti de l’unité et du rassemblement (Party of Unity and Assembly) (PUR), whose president is Moustapha Sy, the moral lodestar of the Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty, a Senegalese Islamic movement (Samson, 2005) connected to the Tidjaniyya\(^ {14}\).

- Madické Niang, considered to be a fervent Mouride\(^ {15}\), was a minister with various portfolios under President Abdoulaye Wade. Despite this long period working with Wade, Niang ran in the 2019 presidential election, although his party—the Parti démocratique sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party) (PDS)—supported Karim Meïssa Wade.

Karim Meïssa Wade’s and Khalifa A. Sall’s candidacies were rejected for the following reasons:

- Wade served as Minister of State for International Cooperation, Regional Development, Air Transport, and Infrastructure from 2009–2012 under the presidency of his father, Abdoulaye Wade. He was charged with corruption and incarcerated in 2014 before being pardoned by President Macky Sall, though he still had to pay a fine and damages with interest. He ran his 2019 presidential candidacy from exile in Qatar, as a member of the PDS, his father’s party. His candidacy was rejected by the Constitutional Council.\(^ {16}\) He did not publicly support any other candidate.
Sall, mayor of Dakar from 2009–2018 and a member of the PS, was sentenced on 30 March 2018 to five years in prison. However, on 26 July 2018, he announced his candidacy for the 2019 election in a written statement from his cell in Rebeuuss prison in Dakar. His candidacy was rejected by the Constitutional Council17 because he was serving ‘a prison sentence for an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period longer than five years [which deprived him] of the right to appear on an electoral ballot and, as a result, of being eligible to vote’.18 He decided to support Idrissa Seck.19

This overview of the political field seeks to shed light on the candidates’ strategies and the volatility of the electorate.

Figures 1.1. and 1.2 give an overview of the approved signature lists and votes cast by candidate and region.

Figure 1.1 illustrates two methods of collecting signatures:
- Candidate Macky Sall used a rationalistic method, collecting between 3,000 and 4,000 signatures from each region, with the exception of Dakar, where he collected around 14,000. He therefore obtained the most even geographical coverage. However, like Ousmane Sonko, El Hadj Issa Sall, and Khalifa A. Sall, he did not collect signatures from expatriates.
- The other candidates employed a more selective method, focusing on their usual or assumed electoral base. Thus, Idrissa Seck focused on the Thiès region, Ousmane Sonko on Ziguinchor (Casamance) and Dakar, Madické Niang on Diourbel (a hotbed of Mouridism), Khalifa A. Sall on Dakar, and Karim Meïssa Wade on Thiès, Sédhiou, and Diourbel. In fact, Karim Meïssa Wade obtained the second-broadest geographical spread, after Macky Sall.

Figure 1.2 shows votes cast by region. Three things are immediately clear:
- Macky Sall won the first round of voting with an absolute majority (58.44%), with votes cast relatively uniformly throughout the country. He won a minority only in the Thiès and Ziguinchor regions.
- Votes for Idrissa Seck (20.50%) and Ousmane Sonko (15.48%) were mostly cast in the Diourbel and Ziguinchor regions, respectively. Both candidates received 20–25% of the Dakar and expatriate vote. Idrissa Seck also won a third of the Thiès region vote, with more than 200,000 votes. This combination of elements, linked to these candidates’ regional influence and the voting ‘instruction’ given, either explicitly or implicitly, by Abdoulaye Wade 20, explains the geographical distribution of their electorates and their respective positions of second and third place.

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17. Ibid.
19. Seven months after the presidential election, on
20. Leader of the PDS, he ran for president in 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993. He served as president from 1 April 2000–2 April 2012, the day his former prime minister Macky Sall succeeded him as president.
Exhibit 1
Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019

Figure 1.1. Approved signatures by candidate and region
Number of signatures

Figure 1.2. Votes cast by candidate and region
Number of votes (in millions)

El Hadj Issa Sall and Madické Niang each received less than 5% of the vote. Madické Niang won about 65,000 votes, barely more than he collected in signatures.

The influence of the signature collection requirement on the 2019 presidential election provoked much controversy. The results illustrate just how tenuous the link between signature collection and votes can be, as El Hadj Issa Sall and Madické Niang had the misfortune of discovering. El Hadj Issa Sall’s electorate evaporated, and the signatures Madické Niang collected in the Diourbel region did not turn into votes. Idrissa Seck did not receive all the votes of those who had signed for Khalifa A. Sall, despite the latter’s support for Seck after his candidacy was rejected.

It is also difficult to clearly identify which other candidates votes for Karim Meïssa Wade went to. After the Constitutional Council approved the candidacies, the presidential campaign, rife with unforeseen developments, transformed the political landscape: El Hadj Issa Sall lost his party’s trust; Idrissa Seck unexpectedly won the support of the Mouride community, thereby depriving Madické Niang of a large part of his electorate; and the rallies that Macky Sall organised in Dakar had a much greater impact than anticipated. Meanwhile, Ousmane Sonko’s communication strategy, which was widely rebroadcast by the media and on social networking sites, bolstered his credibility at the national level.

All these developments point up the fact that collecting the required number of signatures does not guarantee votes. Therefore, as Gély (2018) notes, this ‘nomination procedure does not enter into competition with the voting procedure. They take place at different political and judicial times and are complementary’. The signature collection system limits the total number of candidates, which clarifies the political field and thereby allow the least-informed voters to more easily decide who to vote for. The 2017 parliamentary elections featured forty-seven parties, a record number, which led to some confusion among voters on election day. That said, civil society experts note that ‘in certain conditions, signature collection can be counterproductive. If, for example, electors can easily be bought off, [then] the candidate with the most resources wins’.

A shifting electoral geography
In any case, the rate of voter turnout—66.7%, one of the highest in Senegal’s history—underscores the fact that the new signature requirement procedure, complex as it may seem, did not demobilise voters. My objective, then, is to shed light on both the underlying reasons for this high rate of turnout and the issues

21. El Hadj Sall won 2.07% of the vote; Madické Niang won 0.75%.
Exhibit 2
Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019

Figure 2.1. Macky Sall, candidate-elect

Dakar region

% of votes cast by municipality
98
91
83
79
71
65
59
51
43
35
35
27
7
No data

Average: 58.26%

Total number of votes cast by municipality
165,115
60,000
5,000

En % des suffrages exprimés par commune
59,79
59,79
55,97
53,25
50,27
48,79
47,9
47,21
45,89
44,7
44,05

Figure 2.2. Voter turnout rates

Région de Dakar

% of voters out of total registered voters by municipality
95
81
76
71
67
64
58
51
41

Average: 66.27%

surrounding the current electoral territories. I will pay particular attention to the Dakar region—the capital and its suburbs—because it accounts for a full quarter of the national electorate.

**A deceptive turnout.** The rate of turnout varied from a single to a double rate according to the region (Exhibit 2, Figure 2.2). This variation in rates modified Macky Sall’s absolute majority in the first round. Unsurprisingly, he won a record percentage of votes in the Fouta region, in the north of Senegal, as well as in Sine, where he was born. These results reflect his Haalpulaar background and Serer culture. However, the regions won by Sall saw the lowest rates of voter turnout. In contrast, rates of turnout were much higher (between 70% and 80%) in the opposition regions, around the cities of Thiès and Touba and in the north of Casamance.

At the same time, Figure 2.1 shows a major divide between urban centres, which favoured the opposition, and rural regions, which tended to favour Macky Sall, who was better equipped to campaign there.

The turnout rate and voting data highlight the erosion of Macky Sall’s electoral base. The relatively weak turnout of his electorate reflects growing doubt about his policies.

**New electoral territorialities.** In this context, the data in Exhibit 3 reveal the major changes in Senegal’s electoral geography. The vote was strikingly regional; politically, Senegal looks to be split into three parts:

Macky Sall maintained a solid majority in the Senegal River and Sine regions. This cannot be explained entirely by his background. However, he also received over 90% of the vote in the Podor department and the Matam region. In the department of Fatick, the city where he previously served as mayor, he received over 80% of the vote. The same was true in Foundiougne, where he benefited from Moustapha Niasse’s support. He was also able to conquer new parts of the Kolda and Kédougou regions, as well as along the Louga/Saint-Louis corridor, which had previously favoured, respectively, the Gagnante Wattu Sénégal coalition (led by Abdoulaye Wade), local leaders, and the PUR.

Idrissa Seck confirmed his ability to mobilise the Thiès electorate, but, in a new development, his best results were in Touba, the holy city of the Mouride brotherhood, where he won over 60% of the vote. This should be read as the result of a significant mobilisation of the Mouride electorate, which was disappointed with Macky Sall’s complicated relationships with the marabouts. Moreover, as Bakary Sambe (Laplace, 2019a) notes, Seck was able to take a page out of the Mouride book and run on a programme inspired by the writings of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba.

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23. Interview with Laurent Correau, RFI, March 2012.
24. Moustapha Niasse headed the Benno Bokk Yakaar coalition at the 1 July 2012 presidential election won by Macky Sall. On 30 July 2012, Moustapha Niasse was elected president of the Senegalese National Assembly.
## Exhibit 3

**Election results of the top three candidates**

**Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019**

### Dakar region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>% of votes cast by municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Louis</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiès</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toubà</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bokidiave</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbour</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Number of votes cast for this candidate:** 46,374
- **Total votes:** 10,000

### Idrissa Seck

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>% of votes cast by municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thiès</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toubà</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médina Gounass</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Number of votes cast for this candidate:** 109,607
- **Total votes:** 10,000

### Ousmane Sonko

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>% of votes cast by municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ziguinchor</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambacounda</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Médina Gounass</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbour</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thiès</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Number of votes cast for this candidate:** 33,270
- **Total votes:** 10,000

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Ousmane Sonko won a large majority (57.25%) in his native Casamance, in the south of Senegal, far ahead of Macky Sall’s 38.72%, the latter’s lowest score in the country. Neither Sall’s alliance with Ziguinchor mayor Abdoulaye Balde, nor the opening of the Senegambia bridge, which was built to provide easier access to the Casamance region, were able to hamper Ousmane Sonko’s success. He benefited from the Diola vote in Casamance, particularly in the Bignona, Oussouye, and Ziguinchor departments. That said, as Vincent Foucher writes, ‘Ousmane Sonko’s success in Casamance cannot be reduced to the Diola vote. Doing so would be to neglect the enthusiasm aroused by his youthfulness and his position as an “outsider” and a nationalist’ (Laplace, 2019b).

This analysis of what is a shifting electoral geography sheds light on the uncertainty of the logics behind the socialisation and transmission of political capital, the urban electorate’s lack of trust in Macky Sall, and the strong politicisation of Casamance’s populations.

These new social and geographical divisions provide a glimpse of what is at stake in the local elections scheduled for 2021, with the risk of deepening divisions along community and rural/urban lines, as well as jeopardising the peace process in Casamance.

**Dakar, beyond social divisions.** All these variations in electoral behaviour are visible in the Dakar region. Exhibit 4 looks at the municipal level.

At the regional level, Macky Sall won the most votes, with 48.9%, but he won an absolute majority in only seventeen out of the Dakar region’s fifty-two municipalities. However, he still attained very respectable scores in Dakar-Plateau (49.61%) and Médina (48.27%), where Khalifa A. Sall’s base is strong.

Idrissa Seck’s showing was strongest (31%) in the suburbs and the centre of Dakar. These two electoral terrains can be examined via a logic of legacy and political transfer, respectively. The municipalities in the Pikine department are former President Abdoulaye Wade’s traditional strongholds: the Gagnante Wattu Sénégal coalition, headed by Wade, won its best electoral results there in the 2017 parliamentary election. Most of the population comes from the rural exodus movements that were a result, in particular, of the 1970s drought. However, over the past several years, ‘increasingly frequent floods have created unsanitary conditions that put local residents in danger and lock them in a poverty trap’ (Cissé, Quensière, and Kane, 2018, p. 132). At the same time, Seck benefited from Khalifa A. Sall’s electorate—although he was not able to take full advantage of it, since he was roundly defeated by Macky Sall.
Exhibit 4
Dakar region results
Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019

Macky Sall

Idrissa Seck

Ousmane Sonko

in Dakar-Plateau and Médina. These two municipalities are home to people of vastly different socioeconomic backgrounds. Dakar-Plateau is generally wealthier, while Médina tends to be poorer, along with a few blocks of middle-class homes (Borderon et al., 2014).

Ousmane Sonko’s electorate was in three areas: the pericentre (along the Corniche Ouest), the inner suburbs (Parcelles Assainies and Golf Sud), and the outlying suburbs (Keur Massar and Mbao):

- The Fann-Point E-Amitié districts feature a high proportion of luxury residences reserved for the Dakar elite (Lessault and Imbert, 2013, p. 8), whereas the Mermoz, Sacré-Coeur, Ngor, and, to a lesser extent, Ouakam districts are strongly upper-middle-class (Borderon et al., 2014).
- Grand Yoff, Parcelles Assainies, and Golf Sud are working-class districts. Grand Yoff is the Dakar department’s most populous municipality and saw spectacular population growth of over 44% from 2002 to 201329. The Diola ethnic group from Casamance (Ousmane Sonko’s native region) is well-represented there. High rates of unemployment, particularly among Grand Yoff’s youth, is one of the municipality’s most pressing concerns. Moreover, there is a significant spatial disparity between Grand Yoff’s historical district30 and its new, wealthier districts, where Ousmane Sonko won over 30% of the vote, even surpassing Macky Sall in certain polling places.
- Keur Massar and Mbao belong to a ‘space of contact and transition between the urbanised space and the outlying rural spaces’; the majority of the population is poor, even very poor.

This diversity of residential situations highlights the multitude of social milieux that voted for Ousmane Sonko. His electorate’s eclecticism puts him in an unprecedented position in the political landscape.

Analysing the Dakar region’s results in the 2019 presidential election reveals electoral dynamics that go beyond social divides. Idrissa Seck benefited from the rejection of the candidacy of Karim Meïssa Wade, the biological and political heir to former President Abdoulaye Wade, as well as the support of former Dakar mayor Khalifa A. Sall. But whether these substitution votes will turn into loyal ones remains very unclear, a fortiori in a ‘context of easing political tensions’31 marked by Khalifa A. Sall’s recent release from prison32, and which will likely also be impacted ‘by the pardoning of Karim Wade’33.

30. The Yoff urban area grew out of the fields formerly cultivated by the Lebu people. It also includes the first housing estates, built in the 1960s for those fleeing Dakar’s central slums (Lessault and Imbert, 2013, p. 10).
32. The former mayor of Dakar, Khalifa A. Sall, who had been serving a five-year sentence for embezzling public funds, was released on Sunday 29 September 2019.
33. ‘L’opposant sénégalais Khalifa Sall’.
34. Ethnic belonging is understood here as belonging to a culturally homogenous group.
35. Expatriates were granted the right to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 (Smith, 2015).
Ousmane Sonko’s electoral base appears more solid: he has confirmed himself as the candidate of extremes—from the poorest to the wealthiest—and of rejection, bringing together protests against social inequality and ‘anti-establishment’ demands.

The 2019 presidential election shook up Senegal’s electoral geography. As such, the map can be redrawn to reflect the various political opportunities present within the country: those linked to legacy, political transfer, and community or ethnic belonging. But above all, with the exception of a few permanent features, this new map highlights the volatility of the current electorate, the tenuousness of alliances, and the convergence of a priori disparate social milieux around a common political position.

Transnational flows in the political field

Exhibit 5 offers the opportunity to analyse expatriate electoral territories through the lens of migratory dynamics. International Senegalese emigration began to swell in the 1960s, when most emigrants were migrating from the Senegal River Valley to other African countries and France. Starting in the 1980s, the Mouride community shifted emigration toward Southern Europe, in particular Italy and Spain, as well as to the United States (Robin, 1996). Today, Dakar is the primary hub for emigration, and emigrants are heading to an increasing number of destinations in Africa and Europe, as well as Latin America, Asia, and the Arab world (Lessault, Robin, and Goerg, 2015). According to the World Bank, Senegal received 2.2 billion dollars in remittances in 2017, more than twice the amount it received in development aid. As a result, even though Senegalese expatriates account for just 4.63% of the electorate, their vote is no small matter.

Senegal is one of the African countries that makes the vote most accessible to its diaspora. For the 2019 presidential election, 746 polling stations were opened in forty-nine countries. This geographic network makes it possible to apply an analysis of transnational practices to the political sphere. As Tandian (2017) notes, ‘the transnational behaviour of the Senegalese is not a new phenomenon. As far back as the colonial period, certain intellectuals made statements from their residences in Europe that were intended to influence the political system of their country of origin’. More recently, the nearly simultaneous emergence of information and communication technologies in Senegal and the countries of immigration, as well as the growing number of skilled Senegalese emigrants, has raised the stakes of the transnational vote. The candidates travelled abroad relatively little during the campaign, but they were conscious of the relationships between migrants and the political class, as well as the way transnational networks can act as megaphones: all the candidates made use of the internet, FM radio, public and private digital television channels, and social networking sites accessed via mobile phones.
This logic of transnational communication appears to have borne fruit. The results of the presidential election abroad reproduce the political triptych observed within Senegal’s borders:

- Macky Sall won most of the votes in the Central African countries, where those from the Senegalese River Valley have tended to immigrate.
- The vote for Idrissa Seck aligns with the contours of the Mouride diaspora, from Italy to South Africa to Latin America.
- Ousmane Sonko’s electorate is spatially more complex, and is structured around North America, the Scandinavian countries, a North Africa–Arab peninsula corridor, and more recent immigration destinations in Europe, such as Portugal. This electorate thus brings together several migratory dynamics: brain drain, labour immigration to the Arab world, and the most precarious economic emigration. These three voting blocs have traditionally tended to vote for the incumbent, so this support for Sonko represents a significant change in the political practices of Senegalese living abroad.

This new territoriality of the diaspora reflects a decline in Macky Sall’s electorate in the old immigration countries and increased support for Ousmane Sonko on the part of recent emigrants. This political division holds true for France, the top country for Senegalese immigration. The majority of the electorate residing in France’s automobile industry cities (the industry recruited heavily from the Senegalese River Valley region) voted for Macky Sall. By contrast, the electorate residing in France’s university cities voted largely for Ousmane Sonko. Exhibit 6 shows this spatial division of the Senegalese vote in France.

The variations in voter turnout rates between countries also speak volumes about the political logics of emigrants. The highest rates are in Zambia and Mozambique, where Macky Sall broke 90%, as well as in the Scandinavian countries, where Ousmane Sonko attained his best scores abroad, with over 60% of the vote. The results highlight the solidity of Macky Sall’s relationship with the ‘Diamond Diaspora of the Senegal River’ (Bredeloup, 2007) and confirms Ousmane Sonko’s political influence in the sphere of skilled emigrants and students.

This analysis of the transnational flow of political practices demonstrates just how important the Senegalese expatriate vote is. The vulnerability of immigrants in Europe, the growing importance of skilled emigrants, and the fact that the first generation of emigrants is approaching retirement age all have profound effects on political territorialities. Thus, as Lacroix, Sall, and Salzbrunn (2008) note, ‘political activities demonstrate that the transnational field goes beyond relationships with the country of origin. The transgression of bilateral logics leads to the creation of new alliances within the transnational social space’.

37. The differences are considerable, ranging from 36% in Lebanon to 94% in the Netherlands.

38. For a review of Bredeloup’s work on this subject, see Choplin (2009).
Exhibit 5
Senegalese expatriate vote
Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019

Macky Sall, Benno Bokk Yakaar (BBY)

Countries where the percentage of votes cast for this candidate exceeded 71% are labelled on the map.

Idrissa Seck, Idy 2019 coalition

Countries where the percentage of votes cast for this candidate exceeded 29% are labelled on the map.

Ousmane Sonko, Patriots of Senegal for Work, Ethics, and Brotherhood (PASTEF)

Countries where the percentage of votes cast for this candidate exceeded 41% are labelled on the map.

Exhibit 6
Foreign cities which supported Ousmane Sonko
Senegal presidential election, 24 February 2019

Number of votes per city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>1,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Montréal Ottawa</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of votes cast per city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Montréal Ottawa</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>35%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, while Macky Sall’s and Idrissa Seck’s electoral territories confirm the power of a sociocultural transnationalism, Ousmane Sonko’s point to a different dynamic: they express a demand for social justice that goes beyond social divisions, and which affirms its transnational dimension through an ‘anti-establishment’ discourse.

**Conclusion**

Analysing the results of the 2019 presidential election brings to light the permanencies, new alliances, and ruptures in the electorates at the municipal, national, international level. Ousmane Sonko united a crisis vote with the protest vote of a transnational elite. Idrissa Seck was able to assemble a party that brought together formerly opposing camps (the PDS and the PS) and a circumstantial religious obedience vote. Both therefore benefited from a window of electoral opportunities (Gerstlé, 2003) based on growing social inequalities, a crisis in the political system, and unstable party allegiances. Would Macky Sall, the candidate-elect, have been able to manage all these issues if the election had not been essentially decided in the first round of voting? This unanswered question continues to animate the political restructuring currently underway with an eye to upcoming local elections.
Bibliography


